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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of the breach by Appellant of a road 
construction contract dated September 11, 1974. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court found that Appellant breached the contract 
on September 26, 1975, by refusing to pay for road materials 
produced by Respondent which met the acceptance tests specified 
in the contract, which amounted to an anticipatory breach and 
terminated the contract. The Court awarded Respondent Judgment 
in the amount of $1,539,147,05, comprising payment at contract 
rates for all work performed to the date of the breach, less pay-
ments made thereon by Appellant, anticipated profit on the part 
remaining to be performed, and certain other damages incidental 
to the breach. The Lower Court also allowed Appellant certain 
offsets totalling $192,392.46, and awarded Respondent a net 
Judgment in the amount of $1,346,754.59. 
"RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL" 
The Respondent by its cross-appeal seeks an Order modifying 
the Judgment to award Respondent additional sums as damage for 
rental charges incurred by Respondent, on equipment rented from 
others. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
on September 11, 1974, the State of Utah, through its State 
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Road Commission, (now known as the Department of Transportation) 
entered into a contract with Industrial Construction Inc ) 
' • and 
Pritchett Construction Co., Inc., (a Joint Venture), for the 
construction of a certain portion of Interstate 15 from Hol~n 
to Scipio. This suit arose out of breaches of that contract 
committed by the Appellant, Department of Transportation. 
Prior to the bid opening, Mr. Lalif Wood, President of 
Industrial Construction, Inc., noticed that Sheet 55 of the 
Special Provisions attached to the contract, contained certain 
requirements relating to a drum-dryer mixer (one type of hot 
plant utilized to produce asphalt) and that Sheets 56 and 57 of 
the Special Provisions contained certain provisions relating to 
aggregate storage commonly referred to as "the split stockpile 
method". "Aggregate" is a term that refers to the gravel com-
ponents used to produce asphalt for road surfacing. 
Mr. Wood had seen a similar requirement on a job his com-
pany had performed in Alamo, Nevada, but his company was not 
required to split the stockpile because it did not use a drum-
dryer mixer. (T. 264.) 
Before the bids were submitted, Mr. Wood called Mr. C. v. 
Anderson, the Utah State Highway engineer and Assistant Direc-
tor of the Department of Transportation. Mr. Anderson told 
-2-
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Mr. wood that the split stockpile provision would not pertain to 
Respondent. (T. 38-41.) Respondent bid the project based on 
this information. (T. 662.) 
However, when the work progressed to the point where the 
contractor began to build its stockpile, the Resident Engineer 
(also called the Project Engineer) insisted that the stockpile 
be split. (See Ex. D-5.) After a series of meetings and cor-
respondence on this subject, the contractor wrote a letter to 
the Resident Engineer in which it proposed to set up three stock-
piles, desribing the contents of each pile. The proposal also 
stated: 
"The material will be fed into the dryer as 
required in order to meet the gradation specified. 
"Sufficient material for two days production 
will be stockpiled prior to the start of plant 
mix operations." (Ex. P-2 Emphasis added.) 
The last sentence is a paraphrase of a sentence from Sheet 
56. It should also be noted that neither Sheets 56 and 57 nor 
the contractor's proposal contained any requirement as to where 
the stockpiles were to be located. (See EX. D-4, Sheet 56 and 
Ex. P-2.) 
on June 4, 1975, the Resident Engineer responded by letter 
which stated in part that the contractor's proposal for aggre-
gate storage complied with the contract specifications as bid. 
(Ex. P-3.) 
-3-
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Thereafter, the contractor constructed the three stock0~ 
" 
However, only one was located at the site of the hot 1 t p an . The 
other two were located in a gravel pit approximately 8 miles 
away at the other end of the project. 
At the request of the contractor the Project Engineer s~. 
pled all stockpiles and submitted to the contractor, test report: 
showing the contents of each stockpile. (Ex. P-4.) 
On August 21, 1975, the contractor informed the Project 
Engineer that he intended to install two feeders on the hot plan: 
and to feed both feeders from the single stockpile. If the~-
terial thus produced was not in Specification, whatever was needi' 
from the other two stockpiles would be hauled up and blended in, 
The Project Engineer replied that that would be agreeable with 
him. (T. 140.) 
On September 18, 1975, the contractor commenced hot plant 
operations with the knowledge and cooperation of the Project 
Engineer feeding from only one stockpile. (T. 103-108.) For 
the first six days the contractor produced asphalt having a 
value of more than $29,000.00, all of which was in substantial 
compliance with the Specifications, according to the daily tests 
conducted by the State. (See Ex. P-12, which are the test re-
ports prepared by the State and submitted daily to the contractor. 
As of the sixth day of production, the State had assessed price 
-4-
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reductions agreed to by the contractor in the amount of $977.33. 
(Ex. P-12.) 
The contract documents contain extensive provisions set-
ting out the acceptance standards to be applied to the asphalt 
product produced, and showing the computations by which the bid 
price (in this case $3.00 per ton) could be reduced if the ma-
terial produced deviated from the standards specified in the 
contract. (See Ex. D-4, pp. 40-50.) 
In essence, the Specifications permit a price adjustment 
only for variations in the gradation and bitumen content and the 
density of the asphalt produced, and the roughness and smooth-
ness of the final road surface. (Ex. D-4, p. 50.) 
On the seventh day of production, (September 26, 1975) the 
project Engineer hand delivered to the contractor a letter which 
stated that the contractor would not be paid for the asphalt pro-
duced to that date, because the contractor was not complying 
with the split stockpile method of aggregate storage. (See Ex.P-6.} 
The contractor told the Project Engineer that the letter 
would force the contractor to shut the job down because the 
contractor couldn't continue to produce this material without 
being paid for it. (T. 119-120.} At that point, the contrac-
tor suspended its operations and wrote the Project Engineer a 
letter which stated that the state's action was an arbitrary and 
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capricious decision, which amounted to a breach of the contrac:. 
The contractor reiterated that the contractor could not contin1:; 
to perform under the condition created by the State's action. 
(Ex. P-7.) 
In response, the State reaffirmed its position in another 
letter and stated that continued performance by the contractor 
"will be interpreted as acceptance of a suitable pr ice reduc-
tion yet to be determined. (See Ex. D-3. Emphasis added .. ) 
At the time the contractor suspended its operation, there 
was no other work it could perform, (T. 163.) since it had reache: 
a stage where the traffic through the construction project pre· 
vented any further work. The contractor intended to finish the 
paving which was then in process and switch the traffic onto 
it in order to continue the remaining operations. (T. 156-157.) 
This was frustrated by the letter of September 25, 1975. (T.120. 
However, the contractor felt that with the onset of the 
coming winter the construction work accomplished to the date 
of suspension would create a hazardous condition on the pub-
lic highway through the project (U. S. 91). (See T. 170-171.) 
The contractor called this to the attention of the De-
partment of Transportatio,1, (T. 171-172 ) and tried i:epeatedly 
to come to an understanding on an acceptable solution, but 
reached an impasse. 
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Finally, 01 October 22, 1975, the contractor wrote the De-
partment stating that the contractor felt the greatest consi-
deration should be the safety of the travelling public, and 
therefore the contractor intended to pave sufficient of the 
balance of the north bound lane to turn the traffic from the 
old highway onto the new construction. (Ex. P-9.) 
The contractor performed this work beginning on October 27, 
1975, and continuing for approximately four days. (T. 177, 179.) 
After the traffic was switched the Respondent did no further 
work. The other joint venturer, Pritchett Construction co., 
did some additional work in order to protect the work previously 
accomplished, from damage. (T. 134-136.) 
The Trial of this natter was conducted in two parts. From 
March 25, through April 1, 1976, the Court heard the issues re-
lating only to whether the contract was breached by either party 
and, if so, whether the breach was anticipatory. On April 20, 
1976, the Court ruled that the Appellant had breached the con-
tract by its refusal to pay for Plaintiff's work which was 
within the acceptable limits of the contract, and further, that 
the breach was an anticipatory and total breach of the contract. 
(See Transcript of Hearing, April 20, 1976, p. 2.) 
Thereafter, from June 30, intermittently through July 8, 
1976, the Court heard the issues relating to damages. At the 
-7-
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conclusion of the Trial, the Court entered Judgment for Res-
pondent in the net amount of $1,346,754.59. The State of 
Utah appealed and the contractor cross-appealed from the re-
fusal of the Court to allow the full amount of rentals paid 
by the contractor after the breach on certain essential equip-
ment rented from others. 
Unfortunately, the reporter who prepared the transcript oi 
evidence restarted the page numbers of the hearing on the por-
tion of the Trial related to damages with the number "l". In 
order to clarify the references herein to the pages of the trans· 
cript, Respondent will use a system wherein "(T. 100)" refers 
to page 100 of the transcript on the first phase of the Trial 
relating to breach of contract, and "(T-Dam.100)" refers to page 
100 of the transcript on the second phase of the Trial relating 




THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE SUSTAINED EXCEPT 
AS NOTED HEREAFTER IN RESPONDENT'S CROSS-APPEAL. 
Appellant, in its Brief, has raised five issues on Appeal. 
The first two issues concern alleged errors on the part of the 
Trial court in awarding any relief to Plaintiff. The last three 
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issues are directed at specific items of damage allowed. 
Respondent will address all issues raised by Appellant. 
Before doing so, however, Respondent desires to point out some 
deficiencies in Appellant's first two points on appeal which 
would be the equivalent of a motion to dismiss, as a separate 
ground for disposing the issues discussed in those points. 
Appellant's Point I alleges error on the part of the Trial 
Court in two particulars: 
1) Appellant challenges Conclusion of Law number 2, 
entered by the Trial Court. (Note: Apprently there 
is no challenge to the remaining Conclusions.) 
2) Appellant asserts that the Trial Court erred in 
failing to hold that Plaintiff was guilty of the 
first breach of contract. 
These matters will be discussed in order. 
1) As to Conclusion of Law Number 2. 
Conclusion of Law Number 2 states: 
"2. That the Plaintiff was reasonably led to be-
lieve that an adjustment would be made in the pro-
visions of the said construction contract so ~ 
eliminate the use of the split stockpile method in 
Plaintiff's production of Bituminous Surface Course 
Material." (R. 229.) (Emphasis added.) 
APPELLANT'S POINT I IS ENTITLED IN PART: 
"THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF 
WAS EXCUSED FROM HAVING TO COMPLY WITH THE SPLIT 
STOCKPILE METHOD IS ERRONEOUS AND CONTRARY TO 
LAW •••• " (EMPHASIS ADDED.) 
An examination of the remaining paragraphs of the Conclusions 
-9-
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of Law entered by the trial court discloses that a modificat' ion 
of the contract requirement was subsequently adopted which re. 
quired Plaintiff to construct three stockpiles; (Conclusion No.: 
R. 229); that Plaintiff did in fact construct three stockpiles; 
(Conclusion No. 5, R. 230); that there was no requirement in the 
contract as to where the three stockpiles were to be located; 
(Conclusion No. 4, R. 229); and that Plaintiff was reasonablY, 
led to believe that it was in compliance with the requirements 
of the said construction contract as to the construction and 
location of the three stockpiles. (Conclusion No. 6, R. 230.) 
Consequently, the trial court did not conclude, as assertea 
by Appellant, that Respondent was excused from complying with the 
split stockpile method, but rather the trial court concluded 
that Respondent was led to believe that it had adequately com· 
plied with the requirements of the contract concerning the split 
stockpile method of storing gravel. Appellant's assertions 
in Point I merely amount to an attempt to create a straw-man, 
which is easy to demolish, rather than to demonstrate any de-
feet in the real action taken by the trial court. 
Furthermore, the objections alleged by Appellant, (even if 1 
they were admitted to be valid) come under the heading of harm· 
less errcr, which should be disregarded. (Rule 61, U.R.C.P.)· 
Conclusions of Law numbers 7, 8 and 9, state in substance that 
-10-
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the Butuminous Surface Course asphalt produced by Plaintiff was 
in substantial compliance with the acceptance standards set out 
in the contract, (Conclusion No. 7, R. 230.); that Appellant 
was not reasonably justified in withholding payment therefor 
(Conclusion No. 7, R. 230.); that Appellant's obligation to pay 
for such acceptable asphalt was a material and essential part of 
the performance required of Appellant under the contract and was 
necessary at that time in order to require continued performance 
of Respondent, (Conclusion No. 8, R. 230.); and that Appellant 
breached the contract by its refusal to pay for the asphalt pro-
duced through September 26, 1975, which constituted an antici-
patory breach of the contract on the part of Appellant, which 
terminated the contract and excused Respondent from further per-
formance. (Conclusion No. 9, R. 230-231.) 
Conclusion of Law number 2 is not a necessary foundation 
for the matters contained in Conclusions of Law numbers 7, 8 
and 9, so that a reversal of paragraph 2 would not require a 
reversal of paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 to which Appellant has made 
no objection. 
Consequently, it is submitted that Appellant's arguments 
on this issue are misleading and would not affect any substan-
tial rights of the parties, or require a reversal of the Judgment. 
-11-
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2) As to Appellant's contention that Respondent 
was guilty of the "fir st breach". 
An examination of the pleadings and the transcript of 
trial disclose that this point was not raised before the trial 
court but raised for the first time on appeal. This Court shoul: 
refuse to consider issues and defenses raised for the first timi 
on appeal. See, In re Estate of Ekker, 19 U. 2d 414, 432 p .2d 4i: 
Porcupine Reservoir Co. v. Lloyd W. Keller Corp., 15 u. 2d 318, 
392 P.2d 620. 
Furthermore, if Appellant had intended to raise this point, 
it should have done so as an affirmative defense in its Answer. 
This was not done. Therefore, Appellant waived this defense. 
See Rule 12(h), u. R. c. P. 
The same defect exists with respect to Appellant's conten· 
tion in Point II of its Brief that, " under the doctrine 
of election of remedies the actions of the joint venture part-
~ after the alleged breach constituted an election to con-
tinue performance and Respondent has breached the revived 
contract." (Emphasis added.) 
On the first day of the Trial, Appellant sought and was 
granted leave to amend its Answer and counter-claim. In its 
Amended Answer, Appellant alleged as a Third Affirmative Defense' 
that " .•• Plaintiffs, by their actions, have waived the right 
-12-
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to assert that Defendant has breached the contract on the ground 
and for the reason that Pritchett Construction company has con-
tinued performance under the contract .•. " (R. 69.) (Emphasis 
added.) 
The issues relating to Pritchett Construction co., were 
subsequently severed for trial at a subsequent date by stipula-
tion of the parties on the record. (T-Dam. 10.) No Judgment 
has yet been entered as to the issues which relate to Pritchett 
construction Co., and Pritchett Construction Co. is not a Res-
pondent on this appeal, even though its name continues to ap-
pear in the title of this case. 
However, Appellant never contended before the trial court 
or in its pleadings that the actions of Respondent, Industrial 
Construction, Inc., constituted an election of remedies or an 
election to continue performance, or that "Respondent has breached 
the revived contract" as Appellant now -contends in Point II of 
of its Brief on Appeal. These are also defenses that should 
have been raised by affirmative defense in the pleadings, or 
they are waived according to Rule 12(h), U.R.C.P. Appellant 
should not now be allowed to raise these defenses for the first 
time on appeal. See, In re Estate of Ekker, supra; Porcupine 
Reservoir Co. v. Lloyd w. Keller Corp., supra. 
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For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully subrni tted tha: 
Appellant's Points I and II of its Brief on appeal, and the r~ 
lief requested therein (reversal of the Judgment and a new trial) 
should be dismissed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUSION OF LAW NUMBER 
TWO AND RESPONDENT DID NOT FIRST BREACH THE CONTRACT. 
Respondent does not intend to try to prove (in opposition 
to Point I of Appellant's Brief) that the Trial Court was jus-
tified in holding that Respondent was excused from complying 
with the split stockpile method. As set out in Point I above, 
that was not the nature of the conclusion entered by the trial 
court. 
The trial court did not say in this paragraph that the con· 
tract was modified so as to eliminate the split stockpile re-
quirement. It only said that the Plaintiff was reasonably led 
to believe that the contract would be so modified. 
There is ample support in the record for this conclusion. 
In paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the Findings of Fact, the court 
found in substance that prior to the bid opening, Mr. Lalif 
Wood had a telephone conversation with Mr. C. V. Anderson, the 
· ( 217 ) In substance, Mr. Wood Utah State Highway Engineer. R. • 
testified that he was told by Mr. Anderson that the split stock· 
-14-
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Pile requirement of Sheet #56 would not apply t h' h o is ot plant 
operations if he were the successful bidder. (T. 38-41). It 
was upon this understanding that the Plaintiff submitted its 
bid. (T. 662.) 
It is true tl'a t Mr. Anderson disputed Mr. Wood's testimony. 
(T. 416-421). However, the testimony of Mr. Wood is substantial 
evidence which supports the court's Findings and Conclusion, so 
that they should not be overturned on appeal. See, Wagstaff v. 
Remco, Inc., 540 P.2d 931. 
The Appellant next contends, however, that Conclusion of 
Law No. 2 should nevertheless be reversed because it is presumed 
that all negotiations between parties who subsequently enter 
into a written contract are merged into the contract. 
Here again, it should be noted that the trial court did not 
conclude that the contract was modi£ied prior to the bid open-
ing to conform to the telephone conversation, but it only con-
eluded that plaintiff was reasonably led to believe that the 
contract would be so modified. 
In paragraph 3 of its conclusions of Law, the trial court 
concluded that the construction contract was subsequently modi-
fied by mutual agreement of the parties whereby Plaintiff was 
to construct three stockpiles. (R. 229.) 
-15-
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This conclusion is also supported by the evidence in ~e 
form of a letter which was written on May 28, 1975, by the con-
tractor at the request of the Project Engineer proposing the 
use of three stockpiles. This proposal was approved by letter 
from the Resident Engineer dated June 4, 1975. (Ex. P-3.) 
This modification agreement being reduced to writing and 
entered into subsequent to the date of the original construction 
contract, is not subject to the merger doctrine announced in 
the case cited by Appellant. 
It should also be noted that Appellant has never contended 
either at the trial or in its Brief on appeal that the letter of 
May 28, 1975, (Ex. P-2) did not constitute a valid modification 
of the construction contract. 
On the contrary, the Appellant in its Brief on appeal states: 
"The real question, it is asserted, is rather 
what did Respondent's proposal as contained in the 
letter of May 28, 1975, (Ex. P-2) obligate Respon-
dent to do and has Respondent breached that obli-
gation?" (Appellant's Brief, p. 10. Emphasis added.) 
Appellant next contends that the court was in error in 
finding that "neither the original specification nor the modi· 
fication contained any requirement where the three stockpiles 
were to be located. (Finding of Fact No. 4.) " (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 11.) (Note: The reference should have been to 
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conclusion of Law No. 4.) 
This contention of the Appellant is astounding. Both the 
original specification (Ex. D-4 pp. 56 and 57) and the motifi-
cation referred to (Ex. P-2) are in writing. A simple examina-
tion of those documents reveals that the Conclusion of Law 
referred to was correct, for neither document ccntains any re-
ference whatsoever with respect to the location of the stockpiles. 
In fact, Appellant in its Brief on appeal, concedes that this is 
the fact. (Appellant's Brief, p. 11.) 
Nevertheless, the Appellant argues that because the con-
tractor did not locate the three stockpiles at the site of the 
hot plant, it committed the first breach of the contract, which 
in effect excused the subsequent breach on the part of the Ap-
pellant. At this point, it is appropriate and significant to 
point out that nowhere :in its Brief on appeal does the Appellant 
contend that it did not breach the contract. It merely asserts 
that the Respondent breached the contract first. 
In order to support this assertion, the Appellant relies 
on an amazing process of logic, rather than on solid evidence. 
After conceding that the "language of the special provision" or 
the Respondent's letter of May 28, 1975, does.!:!£! require that 
the stockpiles be located at the hot plant site, Appellant states: 
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"While it is true that the exact language 
does not exist in either Exhibit, Appellant 
asserts that anyone of common intelligence 
would obviously assume that a competent con-
tractor would locate the separate sized piles 
at the plant site." (Appellant's Brief, p. 12. 
Emphasis added.) 
It takes a supremely self-confident lawyer (who is normally 
a layman as regards the contracting business) to make a state-
ment like that. Yet Appellant fails to cite any other substan-
tial basis in support of its contention that the contract requir; 
the stockpiles to be located at the hot plant site. 
:: .... 
Appellant cited the case of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. vs. 
Midwest Realty & Finance Co. 544 P.2d 882 (Utah 1975), where 
this Court stated: 
"Further, when a document is of that char-
acter Q-. e. , ambiguous or uncertairQ , the trial 
court can take extraneous evidence and look into 
the total circumstances to determine what the par-
ties should reasonably be deemed to have understood 
thereby." (Emphasis added.) 
Among the "total circumstances" which were introduced into 
evidence in this case as having a bearing on the understanding 
of the parties, were the following: 
a. The contractor's letter of May 28, 1975, (Ex.P-2) 
states: 
"Aggregate will be stored in three (3) 
stockpiles. The natural materials will be 
directed into one stockpile. The material 
being crushed will be split on the No. 4 screen 
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the plus 4 material will be put into a second 
pile and tl1e. ipinus 4 material will be put 
into a third pile. The material will be 
fed into the drier ~ required in order to 
meet the gradation specified." °'(E;nphasis-;dded.) 
b. The contractor testified that he constructed the 
plus 4 and the minus 4 stockpiles in Pit #2, (at 
the crusher at the south end of the project), while 
the remaining pile was built in Pit #4. (At the 
north end of the project) , which was also the lo-
cation of the hot plant. (T. 65-66.) 
c. The State personnel took tests of the material 
in these stockpiles to determine whether they 
would meet the requirements. (T. 67.) Therefore, 
they obviously knew the locations of the stock-
piles. 
d. The State personnel rendered written reports of 
the content of each pile to the contractor (T. 67-70.) 
These reports were introduced into evidence as Ex.P-4 
and the location of each pile is noted on the cor-
responding report. 
e. Both Sheet 56 of Ex. D-4 and the contractor's 
letter of May 28, 1975, (Ex. P-2) state that the 
contractor will have sufficient material in the 
stockpiles for two day's operations~ com-
mencing his hot plant operations. w. J. Stephenson, 
the State Materials Engineer, testified that accor-
ding to the Specifications, it is the responsibility 
of the Project Engineer to determine whether the 
contractor has two day's material in the stockpiles 
before the hot plant operations are commenced. (T.327.) 
f. The evidence was uncontroverted that prior to com-
mencing its hot plant operations on September 18, 
1975, the contractor notified the Project Engineer 
of its intention to start up and requested the 
State to have its personnel there to run the accep-
tance tests required by the contract. (T. 103-108.) 
No one testified as to any objection on the part of 
the Project Engineer to the start-up notice on the 
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basis that the contractor did not have the required 
stockpiles at the hot plant site, or on any other 
basis. 
Based upon this state of the evidence, the trial court was 
clearly justified in determining that from the total circumstan-
ces the parties should reasonably be deemed to have understood 
that the contractor was not required by the contract to have its 
stockpiles physically located at the hot plant site. 
This was also supported by Conclusion of Law No. 5, which 
states that the two stockpiles which were not at the hot plant 
site "were a small distance from the hot plant but were avail-
able for blending purposes if the contractor found their use to 
be necessary." (R. 230.) 
Taken together, these Conclusions of Law, (which are 
amply supported by the evidence) demonstrate a coherent, rea-
sonable interpretation of the intention of the parties. 
Appellant also attempts to assert that the asphalt ma-
terial produced by Respondent did not meet with the specifica-
tions. Yet the evidence is uncontroverted tra t between September 
18, 1975 and September 26, 1975, the contracor produced asphalt 
having a value at contract prices of $29,712.90 against whi~ 
the State was allowed to deduct $977. 33 for material which did 
not totally comply with the Specifications. Furthermore, 
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the State's Materials Engineer, testified that so long as the 
contractor's product did not fall below the 70% pay factor 
the contractor was producing acceptable material according to 
the contract. (T. 348.) The lowest pay factor on any day for 
material produced by Respondent was 90%. (Ex. P-12.) 
Appellant also argues that Respondent first breached the 
agreement by refusing to comply with directions of the Project 
Engineer. As noted above, this defense was raised for tre 
first time on appeal. 
The basis for this assertion is a letter which the Project 
Engineer wrote the contractor on September 23, 1975 (five days 
after the contractor had started up its hot plant operations). 
This letter was introduced into evidence as Ex. P-5. In it the 
Project Engineer acknowledged that the contractor had indeed 
constructed three stockpiles as proposed by the letter of May 
28, 1975, and that the asphalt material being produced was in 
substantial compliance with the gradation requirements of the 
contract. However, the Project Engineer also stated that two 
of the stockpiles were "unavailable for use at the hot mix 
plant. " He then concluded: 
"To comply with sub-sections numbers 
403.03 and 407.03, you are directed to 
supply two or more stockpiles at the 
plant site" (Ex. P-5.) 
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Appellant's Brief states as follows: 
"Appellant's letter of September 23, 1975, 
(Ex. P-5) and Respondent's continued refusal 
to comply with the Engineer's direction to p10-
vide at least two stockpiles at the hot plant 
site, (R. 6 73) constituted a breach of contract." 
(Emphasis added.) (See Appellant's Brief, p.16.) 
However, contrary to Appellant's assertion, no witness tes-
tified nor was any evidence introduced to the effect that the 
contractor refused (not to mention "continued refusal") to com-
ply with the Engineer's direction. 
Mr. wood testified that after he received the letter in 
question {Ex. P-5) he had a conversation with the Resident En-
gineer in which he told the Resident Engineer in substance that 
material from the other stockpiles was available within 20 minute; 
that he didn't need the material from the other stockpiles; and 
that he told the Engineer that if he would give the contractor 
a letter directing it to move the stockpiles and agreeing to pay 
for the material if the contractor did not use it, it would be 
moved. (T. 115.) No one testified that there was any further 
action taken on this subject. It is respectfully submitted that 
the foregoing does not constitute a refusal to follow the order 
of the Engineer. Furthermore, the contractor is not bound to 
accept the Engineer's unilaterial interpretation of the con-
tract. The contractor is bound only to follow the lawful orders 
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of the Engineer. 
The most that could be said for Ex. P-5 is that it expresses 
the view of the Project Engineer that the Special Provisions re-
quired all stockpiles to be located at the hot plant site, al-
though the provisions themselves are silent on the matter. (See 
Ex. D-4, pp. 56-57.) However, even the State's own witnesses 
testified that the contractor's let~er of May 28, 1975, (Ex.P-2) 
had modified the Special Provisions (T. 361.) See also Ex. D-11, 
which is an inter-office memo from w. J. Stephenson (the State 
Materials Engineer) to the Project Engineer in which he states 
in part: "Any further interpretations or modifications of the 
Specifications, as seems to be included in your letter of 9/23/75, 
should not be considered." (Emphasis added.) 
In view of the total evidence, the trial court was justi-
fied in concluding that the contract documents did not contain 
any requirement as to where the three stockpiles were to be 
located; that the plaintiff did construct the three stockpiles 
required, all of which were available for use if necessazy; and 
that the contractor was reasonably led to believe that it was in 
compliance with the requirements of the construction contract as 
to the construction and location of the stockpiles, in that the 
location of the three stockpiles was at all times known to the 
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Defendant, and on September 18, 1975, the plain tiff was allowec 
by the Defendant to start up it hot plant and commence its 
paving operations without any objection from the Defendant. 
(See Conclusions of Law Nos. 4, 5 and 6. R. 229-230.) 
POINT III 
THE RESPONDENT WAS NOT GUILTY OF THE FIRST BREACH OF THE 
CONTRACT AND DID NOT ELECT TO CONTINUE PERFORMANCE AFTER THE 
BREACH OF CONTRACT BY APPELLANT. 
Respondent has covered in Point II the assertion of Appell-
ant to the effect that the contractor allegedly breached the 
contract fir st. Suffice it here to say that there is no basis 
in the evidence for such assertion, and the Appellant raised 
this argument for the first time on appeal. 
The Appellant has also asserted that " ... the actions of 
both of the Respondent joint venture partners subsequent to the 
breach determined by the trial court constitute an election to 
proceed with performance of the contract ...• " (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 18. Emphasis added.) 
This assertion is also disputed by Respondent. In support 
of this assertion, Appellant has cited cases to the effect that 
forfeitures are not favored in the law. Respondent submits that 
h · · th· case does not involve sue cases a re not appropriate, since is 
a forfeiture, but rather deals with breach of contract. 
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Appellant cited several cases which supposedly support its 
position that " •• • work done after a breach is to be paid for 
at contract prices and binds him to perform." (Appellant• s 
Brief, p. 22.) 
However, Appellant has carefully avoided any discussion of 
the real test of an election to continue under the contract, i.e., 
did the contractor intend to continue under the contract? All 
the cases cited by Appellant in support of its position held 
that in those cases the contractor intended to maintain the con-
tract in force after breach by the other party. 
The same is not true in the instant case. Here the court 
found that Repondent perrarmed work after the date of the breach 
because of unsafe conditions on Highway 91. " • and solely 
in the interest of protecting the motoring public from undue 
risks in transversing the construction project. • " (Finding 
of Fact No. 24, R. 222.) This finding is supported by sub-
stantial evidence in the record. 
Mr. wood testified that after the breach on the part of 
the State which caused the contractor to suspend its operations, 
he contacted c. v. Anderson, the State Highway Engineer, and 
told him that the existing road (Highway 91) through the project, 
constituted a hazard which should not be left through the winter 
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and that something had to be done. (T.130.) Mr. Wood also des. 
cribed the hazard which had been created by the t cons ruction o: 
the freeway embankments on each side of Highway 91, and the pla. 
cing of drains to direct water into the median (which was where 
Highway 91 was located at that time), and testified that, in h 
opinion, in freezing weather any cars caning down the road int 
canyon would have no other place to go than just to run into eat 
other. (T. 169-171.) He also stated that in order to remedy tf.:. 
hazard, he went to work so that the traffic could be switched 
from Highway 91 in that area onto the north bound lane. (T .169.) 
He also testified that he had previously met with Blaine 
Kay, (the Director of Highways for the State of Utah) , and told 
him, "if someone had an accident in that area, both ourselves 
and the State would have a pretty hard time coming up with a 
reason for leaving it in that condition." (T. 172.) Mr. Kay 
responded that he woul<l contact the District Office and get back 
in touch with the contractor, but he failed to do so. (T. li3.) 
Finally, before doing the work in question, the contractor, 
on October 22, 1975, delivered to the State the following letter: 
"This will acknowledge the letter which you 
hand delivered to our office on Octooer 21, 1975. In 
view of the extensive efforts which we have made to 
finish the north bound lane to the point where traffic 
can be turned on to it, and in view of the constant re-
sistance and interference which we have received 
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from the Department, which have frustrated all of 
our efforts to date, beginning with your letter of 
September 25'. 1975, we do not appreciate your opening 
statement which attempts to inpugn our intentions in 
this regard. 
"Furthermore, we do not intend to undertake the 
'corrections' which you outlined in your letter, as 
we consider that our contract with the state has been 
terminated due to the breach of contract on the part 
of the state. 
"However, solely in the interest of the safety of 
the public, we do intend to do such work as is required 
to put the traffic onto the north bound lane, and we are 
firm in our position that we are entitled to be paid for 
that work on the basis of force account. 
"We invite your cooperation in getting this work 
done. In view of the private assurances which we have 
received from you and from others, we do not expect any 
interference from the state, since we feel that this is 
emergency work, being done under emergency conditions." (Ex.P-9.) 
In response to the foregoing evidence the Appellant pro-
ferred testimony to the effect that it had made two contingency 
plans to handle the traffic either by using Highway 91, or by 
using the State maintenance forces to complete the necessary pav-
ing to turn the traffic onto the north bound lane. (T. 700.) How-
ever, it became clear that these plans had not be communicated to 
the contract and the Court sustained an objection to the proffer. 
(T. 701.) 
Since the crucial question is to determine whether the con-
tractor intended to proceed under the contract, it is respectfully 
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submitted that the State's proffer of proof was properly r · 
e Jee. 
ted. Since the State's plans were never made known to the con. 
tractor, they could hardly be probative of the contractor's 
intentions in doing the work performed after operations were 
shut down. 
The evidence as to the work done by Pritchett Constructior. 
Company was admitted on a proffer of proof by Pritchett' s attor. 
ney, which the State's attorney admitted by stipulation. (T.lJl. 
That proffer stated that after Industrial Construction disconti: 
work there were two items which Pritchett felt it was important· 
complete to protect the public and preserve the job from subsk 
tial damage. The first item was to complete a culvert which wa; 
necessary to handle the spring run-off. This matter was dis-
cussed with the project engineer, who desired to have that work 
done, and who stated that something would have to be done if th; 
culvert were not completed. That work was done at a cost to 
Pritchett Construction of approximately $5,000.00 in labor and 
another $5,000.00 in materials. The second item was the install· 
ation of an expansion joint on a bridge which had been construe:: 
This joint was necessary to protect the bridge against winter 
weather and to keep ice out of it. This work required about or.< 
man-day. (T. 135-136.) 
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When measured against a total contract price of almost 
$7,000,000.00, these items would not appear to indicate any in-
tention of waiving the breach and resuming operations. 
In its brief, Appellant asserts tra t " • plans had been 
made (Py the State) which alleviated the need for the work to be 
done as alleged by Pritchett." (Appellant's brief, p. 24.) How-
ever, the same witness for the State testified that he didn't 
know of anyone who knew of these plans, except for himself and 
the Project Engineer. (T. 682.) He also testified that in his 
opinion it ~ necessary to do something to let the water drain 
away from the grade (road embankment) in order to save the grade. 
(T. 683.) 
The evidence before the court amply supports the Findings 
of Fact entered by the trial court, which this court should sustain. 
POINT DI 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS AWARD OF ANTICIPATED 
PROFITS. 
The trial court found that the State of Utah breached the 
construction contract and that such breach was a material breach 
of its duties under the contract, which constituted an antici-
patory breach by Defendant. The trial court awarded Plaintiff 
$340,025.18, as the amount of profit anticipated to be earned 
on the portion of the contract remaining to be performed as of 
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the date of the breach by Appellant. 
Apparently, Appellant does not appeal from the findings of 
the court that its breach constituted an anticipatory breach 
(since that issue was not raised on appeal), but claims only that 
the amount awarded is excessive. 
Admittedly, since we are dealing with profits which the con-
tractor anticipated would be earned over the future performance, 
and since the contract was not performed due to the breach and 
termination thereof by the State, the figures are not as suscep-
tible of definite proof as they would be, had the contract been 
performed. However, it is a well recognized rule of law that the 
difficulty involved in exact determination of damages for lost 
profits does not preclude their recovery. In establishing loss 
of future profits it is only the fact that some loss has resulted 
from Appellant's breach which must be proved with certainty. The 
amount of lost profits may be estimated from all the evidence ad· 
mitted. See, Howarth v. Ostergard, 20 u.2d 183, 515 P.2d 442; 
Gardner v. The Calvert, 253 F.2d 395; Smith v. Onyx Oil & Chemi· 
cal Co., 218 F.2d 104. 
The cases do not lay down a single formula by which antici· i 
pated profits must be calculated, and various methods have been 
approved. Thus, in Pat Jo Murphy, Inc. v. DrummondDolomite, ll!E.;.• 
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232 F.Supp. 509, the court computed anticipated profits by find-
ing the average percentage of the contractor's net income com-
pared to its gross income for the previous five years, and applied 
that percentage figure to the costs the contractor incurred on 
the contract in question. 
In Frank Horton & Co. v. Cook Electric Co., 356 F.2d 485, the 
court awarded anticipated profits to the contractor in the amount 
of $175,917.84. The appeals court stated: 
"In arrving at this figure, the court con-
sidered a rough cost estimate prepared by Horton 
in November, 1960, a more detailed estimate also 
prepared by Horton in January, 1963, and Horton's 
own testimony. Cook argues that the detailed esti-
mates should not have been admitted as the summaries 
of an expert because the estimates were self-serving 
and because Horton did not sufficiently explain the 
manner in which the work would have been performed. 
The court, however, expressly recognized the self-
serving nature of the cost estimates. It adjusted 
the estimates upwards in many instances, and chose 
to credit Horton's calculations in other instances 
• • . • we think that the district judge properly 
admitted Horton's cost memoranda. Horton~ calcula-
tions provided the best method of proving lost profit 
which could have been adopted. (Id. 356 F.2d at 492.) 
(Emphasis added.) 
The computation in the instant case is somewhat similar to 
that presented in the Horton case, supra. Mrs. Hitchcock, the 
office manager of Industrial Construction, Inc., testified that 
she participated in the preparation of the bid on the contract 
in issue. (T.-Dam. 143.) She testified as to the elements 
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which were estimated at that time as anticipated cost and t· an l· 
cipated profit of the contract items in preparing the contractm 
bid, (T.-Dam. 17-20.) and stated 30% was about normal for~ 
profit. (T.-Dam. 149-150.) Mrs. Hitchcock also adjusted this 
gross profit to arrive at~ profits. (T.-Dam. 146-147.) 
She also identified and there was introduced into evidence 
as Exhibit P-41, a computation of anticipated profits on the wor'. 
remaining to be done as of the date of Appellant's breach of the 
contract. In some cases the profits originally anticipated wen 
adjusted downward on Exhibit P-41 because of the contractor's ell· 
perience to the date of the breach. (T.-Dam.107-109.} 
The State did not introduce any expert witness who could te: 
tify as to anticipated costs and profits. However, Robert Rawle: 
a witness called by the State, testified that the Special Condi· 
tions applicable to this construction contract allowed the con· 
tractor a profit equal to 30% of the cost of labor for all work 
done on force account (cost plus) • (T.-Dam. 192-193.) 
It should be noted that the State has not challenged the 
sufficiency of this evidence, but claims only that the figures 
shON that there would not be enough money left in the unpaid 
amount of the total contract price (after deducting anticipated 
costs) to justify this award. (Appellant's brief, p. 25.) 
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The State has included in its brief a complicated and hard-
to-follow computation, which it claims justifies its position. 
Respondent asserts that the computation is in error in several 
particulars. 
In the first place, the figures used by the State do not 
coincide with the flgures as found by the Court • (Cf., Find:ing 
of Fact No. 25, R. 222-223.) 
In the second place, on the bottom half of page 30 of Ap-
pellant's brief the figure of $166,876.38 has been deducted from 
the balance available to pay profits. These figures are a total 
of four items representing overpayments to the contractor for 
work already performed prior to the date of the breach. While 
the court found that credit should be allowed the State for 
these items, they actually represent a reduction of the amount 
paid on the contract prior to September 25, 1975, and therefore, 
a corresponding increase in the amount remaining available to be 
paid for work done after that date. The doubling effect of de-
ducting rather than adding this sum to the balance available 
creates an error in the amount of $333,742.76, which is almost 
enough by itself to account for the full amount of anticipated 
profit allowed by the Court •. When added to the $90,301.35 which 
Appellant admitted as still remaining, (Appellant's brief, p.32), 
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it becomes apparent that there is approximately $425,000.00 
available to pay the anticipated profit awarded by the court 
in the amount of $340,025.18. 
Based upon the evidence presented, the trial court fou~ 
that the contractor had anticipated a gross profit of 30% on 
this contract. The court then reduced this to 20% to arrive 
at ~ profit. (R. 228.) It is apparent from the evidence that 
the amount awarded was substantailly less than the amount which 
would have been justified by the testimony of either the witness 
for the State (Mr. Rowley) or the witness for the contractor, 
(Mrs. Hitchcock). This would appear to be within the guidelines 
and the sound discretion of the trial judge as laid down by thi: 
court in the case of Even Odds, Inc., v. Nielson, 22 U.2d 49, 
448 P.2d 709 as follows: 
"Speaking generally about damages, the desired ob-
jective is to evaluate any loss suffered by the most 
direct, practical and accurate method that can be 
employed. 
* * * * * 
"We have no disagreement with the proposition that 
the fact-trier should not be permitted to arbitrarily 
ignore competent, credible and uncontroverted evidence. 
Nevertheless, he is not bound to slavishly follow the 
evidence and figures given by any particular witness. 
Within the limits of reason it is his perogative to place 
his own appraisal upon the evidence which impresses him 
as credible and to draw conclusions therefrom in accor-
dance with his own best judgment." 
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For the foregoing reasons, the award of anticipated profits 
should be either sustained or adjusted upwards. 
POINT V 
THE AWARD OF GENERAL DAMAGES IS PROPER AND SHOULD BE SUSTAINED. 
In its brief, Appellant states that is "is not contesting 
the right of a court toa.vard general damages, assuming the fact 
of a breach of contract." Appellant limits its attack to an asser-
tion that the award is not supportable by substantial evidence in 
the record. 
The court awarded general damages in the sum of $100,000.00, 
(the sum prayed for in Plaintiff's Complaint) based upon a find-
ing that the Plaintiff had suffered this damage as the probable 
and necessary result of the intentional acts constituting the an-
ticipatory breach by Defendant. The court found that Plaintiff 
was damaged in that Plaintiff was· unable to bid and bond other 
work while this matter was unresolved; that the breach of Defen-
dant also damaged Plaintiff's credit reputation by interrupting 
Plaintiff's cash flow; that Plaintiff's earning capacity was dam-
aged; and that by reason of Defendant's acts, Plaintiff had been 
subjected to suits from other creditors on this contract, which 
resulted in additional counsel fees (in those other cases) and 
other normal damages. (See Finding of Fact No.32(d), R.227.) 
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This finding was based upon the testimony of Mrs. Hitchcoc'. 
office manager of the contractor. 
As noted above in Point IV, after the fact of loss is estat. 
lished, the court can estimate the amount of damage " frc: 
the facts in evidence, including the inferences to be drawn f!.2£ 
them, and the probabilities which they suggest." Gardner v. The 
Calvert, 253 F.2d 395, 399. (Emphasis added.) 
Among the facts in evidence pertinent to this issue are the 
following: 
1. The Plaintiff had the contracting capacity to 
bid and bond th is contract, amounting to almost $7, 000,000. 
Part of this was to be performed by sub-contractors to 
w~om Plaintiff was liable. 
2. At the same time the contractor was also perform-
ing another contract for the State of Utah. (T.-Dam.173.) 
3. Construction commenced on this contract August 24, 
1974, (T.-Dam.35); the breach occurred September, 1975, 
(or a total time in progress of 13 months) , during which 
time the contractor had received $3, 715, 324 for work perfor:; 
Among the inferences which could be drawn from this evidence 
are the following: 
1. The contractor's average monthly cash flow from 
this project alone was $285,795.00 
2. The fact that the State improperly terminated 
the construction contract with the contractor does !!.Qi 
excuse the contractor on the sub-contracts and equip-
ment rental agreements it had entered nto in reliance 
upon his contract with the State. 
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3. Yet the State's breach and termination of the 
contract deprived the contractor of the cash flow needed 
to pay its sub-contractors and suppliers, and subjected 
the contractor to suits from them. 
4. The fact that the State refused to recognize 
its breach and make appropriate relief available to the 
contractor, but, on the contrary, insisted that the con-
tract was still in force, tied up at least $7,000,000 of 
Plaintiff's bonding capacity until this dispute was re-
solved, a period of 16 months (not counting time on appeal.) 
Against this figure alone the award of $100,000.00 repre-
sents a recovery rate to Plaintiff of only about 1% per annum. 
All of these types of damage are normal and necessary con-
sequences of the breach of this contract, and as such could have 
been foreseen at the time the contract was entered into. Conse-
quently, these items are compensable within the rule of reasonable 
foreseeability. See, Pacific Coast Title Ins. Co. v. Hartford 
Accident and Indemnity Co., 7 U.2d 377, 325 P.2d 906, 907. 
It is most probable, in view of the amounts involved, that 
the trial court would have awarded damages in a greater amount, 
but limited the recovery to $100,000 because that was all that 
was prayed for in Plaintiff's Complaint. 
From the foregoing, it would appear that the award was 
supported by substantial evidence, an:! should be sustained. 
POINT VI 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COURT'S ALLOWANCE OF VARIOUS 
OTHER ITEMS OF DAMAGE AND THE REJECTION OF CLAIMED OFF-SETS. 
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under Point V of its brief, Appellant challenges five items 
of damage awarded to Respondent by the trial court, claiming there 
was no evidence to support these awards. Appellant also com-
plains that the court failed to grant a greater off-set than was 
allowed for one item referred to as "finishing the sub-grade." 
These challenges go only to the question of whether the 61i-
dence supports the court's awards. Respondent asserts the evidence 
submitted supports the court's decision. 
(1) unrecoveIErl cost of water. 
Mrs. Hitchcock, the office manager of Respondent, testified 
that as of the time the contractterminated due to the breach of 
Appellant, the contractor had not recovered the sum of $19,573.23, 
constituting the unpaid balance of a total cost of $77,372.04. 
Exhibit P-52 was introduced into evidence showing the computation 
of this item. 
Appellant's attack on this item is based upon Appellant's 
view that the cost of water must be included under an item enti· 
tled, "Mobilization", which is an item in the contract, (the 
amount of which is determined by the contractor on a bid basis) 
to compensate the contractor for setting up costs incurred in 
preparatiun of its performance under the contract. 
Appellant quotes an extract from Section 601.01 of the 
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standard Specifications (Ex. D-2 p. 269) which defines "Mobiliz-
tion". However, although Appellant has underlined the last four 
lines, it has ignored the effect of the words " ... not other-
wise paid for 
section 207 of the same specifications (Ex. D-2,pp.82,83) 
is a section entitled "Watering", and provides that water shall 
be paid for at the unit contract price per 1,000 gallons, showing 
that payment for water is not normally included under the head-
ing of "Mobilization". 
Mrs. Hitchcock testified that the Special Provisions for this 
contract required that the cost cf water has to be included in other 
items of work (T.-Dam.34.) She testified that the contractor had 
allocated the cost of water to the items of the contract that re-
quired the use of water. (T.-Dam. 37). This testimony was fur-
ther corroborated by her testimony as to anticipated profits,in 
that she testified that the allocated cost of water was charged as 
an expense to the various items where water was used in computing 
the amount of profit anticipated. (See T.-Dam. 104, 127.) 
Respondent submits that the foregoing constitutes substantial 
evidence and amply supports the Court's decision. 
(2) SALARIES TO KEY PERSONNEL 
(4) EQUIPMENT REANTAL PAID TO OTHERS 
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These points will be covered in Respondent's Cross-Appeal, 
under point VII, which is incorporated herein in opposition to 
Appellant's arguments. 
(5) BITUMINOUS PAVING DONE AFTER BREACH 
Appellant argues only that recovery for this item should be 
the contract price or the reasonable value of the work, rather 
than the basis used by the Court. 
It is respectfully submitted that in view of the court's find·! 
I 
ings, that the contract was terminated on September 26, 1975, due 
to Appellant's breach (from which finding there has been no appeal), 
it would be totally inconsistent for the court to base its award 
on prices found in this contract. 
Furthermore, since the court found that the contractor per-
formed the work ". • • to turn the traffic from that portion of 
Highway 91 which constituted a danger to the motoring public" 
(R.227.), how could any standard of proof be devised to show the 
reasonable value of the benefit conferred upon the public by rea-
son of averting that danger? 
On the other hand, the State's own witness testified that 
the State had formulated plans which included doing the same work 
as performed by the contractor, but using the State's own main-
tenance forces. (T. 700.) Since the State failed to offer any 
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evidence as to its anticipated cost of doing the work with its 
adn forces the trial court could justifiably reason that the costs 
incurred by the contractor plus a reasonable allowance for pro-
fit would be cheaper than the costs incurred by the State to do 
the same work. (Otherwise, it would appear that the State could 
save money by doing all road construction work with its own forees 
rather than contracting out the work as is its normal practice.) 
Under this assumption the amount awarded would be less than 
the reasonable value of the work (measured by the costs saved El. 
the State) and the award should be affirmed. 
(3) RESTORATION OF PRICE REDUCTION 
The court found that on the fourth day of asphalt production 
the State forces made an error in the test results, and the court 
restored to the contractor a price reduction of $1,822.37 which 
the State had unilaterally attempted to assess. 
The State "finds this to be one of the most distasteful acts 
of the trial court." (Appellant's brief pp.43-44.) This is "dis-
tasteful" because it is difficult for the State to admit it 
commits errors. Yet that is precisely what Mr. Weldon Heaton, (the 
State employee responsible for the error) admitted on the stand. 
(T. 528.) 
Mr. wood testified that as a result of the information he 
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received from this erroneous test result, he ordered adjustments 
to be made in the hot plant, and that before the error in the 1Est 
information was discovered the hot plant had been readjusted. (T.11:\ 
Furthermore, Ex. P-16, which is a letter from the Project En· 
gineer on the same subject admits that changes had been made in 
the hot plant. (See Ex. P-16, second page, 1st paragraph.) 
It is respectfully submitted that the restoration of this at· 
tempted pr ice reduction is amply supported by substantial evidence. i 
(6) OFFSET CLAIMED BY THE STATE BUT NOT ALLOWED BY THE COURT. 
The Appellant claimed that it was entitled to a reduction or 
offset against amounts previously paid the contractor under the 
item "Roadway Excavation" because some of the embankment had not 
been "finished" (i.e., graded to a smooth furface) at the date of 
the breach. The contractor conceded that an offset in the amount o: 
$11, 055 would be proper. This figure was based upon the opinion o: 
Mr. Wood, President of Respondent, of the cost of the finishing 
work Plaintiff was not required to perform. (T.-Dam. 542-552.) 
The law is clear that the basis for determining the amount 
of the offset was the contractor's cost of the work it was not re· 
quired to do. See, Hammaker v. Schleigh, 15 7 Md. 652, 14 7 Atl. 790. 
In support of its claimed -:iffset, the State produced Robert 
Rowley, a Project Engineer on a different job, which Respondent 
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was also performing for the State of Utah (T.-Darn. 173.) Mr. 
Rowley produced a summary of men and equipment purportedly used 
by the same contractor in its operations to finish grade the em-
bankment constructed on the ~project. (See Ex. D-62.) 
However, Mr. Rowley admitted that this summary was not a fair 
estimate of the contractor's cost to complete this item. (T.-Dam. 
194-195.) In fact, Mr. Rowley testified that his summary was in-
tended to show what that operation would cost the State if the 
work were done on force account or cost plus. (T.-Darn. 193.) For 
that purpose Mr. Rowley had computed equipment costs based upon an 
hourly rental rate, which he said also includes profit and other 
factors (T.-Darn. 187.) Also, he admitted that his labor figures 
included not only the cost payable by the contractor,but an addi-
tional 30% for profit, which was allowed by the State in its force 
account formula. (T.-Dam. 188.) 
In view of these admissions, it would appear that Mr. Rowley's 
testimony and his summary (upon which Appellant's claimed offset is 
based) simply has no bearing on the real issue. Appellant, in ef-
feet, concedes this when it states in its brief on appeal, (in 
arguing a different point) : 
"As the court knows, a force account arrangement is 
only resorted to when a price for work cannot otherwise 
be arrived at. It is artificial and bears little relation 
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to reality so far as costs of an overall contract 
(sic.)." (Appellant's brief, p. 33, Emphasis added.) 
In view of Mr. Rowley's admission thc:t: his evidence was not 
designed to disclose the cost saving to the contractor of not 
having to perform the finishing work, the court was justified in 
rejecting it, and probably would have committed reversable error 
if it had made any awarded based on Mr. Rowley's evidence. 
POINT VII 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FAILING TO AWARD RESPONDENT 
THE SUM OF $446, 531. 42 FOR THE EXPENSE OF EQUIPMENT RENTED FROM 
OTHERS. 
At the time the State breached the construction contract, the 
contractor shut down its operations. Thereafter, the contractor 
released its construction crews, and turned back non-essential 
equipment rented from others. However, the State asserted that 
it had not breached the contract and that the contractor was re-
quired to complete the construction work. (See, Appellant's 
Answer and Counter-Claim and Amendment thereto, R. 39, 69.) 
Therefore, the contractor retained its key personnel and 
certain of the rental equipment which it could not replace (T.-Dam. 
28), until the end of April, 1976, when the court ruled in favor 
of Respondent on this issue. 
During this interval of seven months, while the responsibiliti 
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of the contractor to d9 the work remained in doubt, the contrac-
tor incurred out-of-pocket expense in salaries for its key per-
sonnel in the amount of $39,773.48, and paid out $446,531.42 
in rental payments to others on the essential equipment it had 
retained. 
The trial court awarded Respondent damages for the full 
amount of the salaries paid to its key personnel for the entire 
period. However, the court awarded only the sum of $191,370.00 
for equipment rental payments, which the court stated approxi-
mated three month's rental, instead of the seven month's rental 
claimed by Respondent. 
The court based its award on certain testimony of Mr. Wood, 
to the effect that the equipment retained would have been needed 
for approximately three months had the breach .!12!. occurred. 
This award is inconsistent for if, as the Court determined, 
it was reasonable for the contractor to retain its key employees 
on the payroll for seven months while the status of the con-
tract was in doubt, it should also be prima facie reasonable for 
the contractor to retain necessary equipment rented from others 
for the same period. 
The determination of this matter relates to the foreseeability 
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of potential harm in each case by releasing the contractor's key 
employees on the one hand or its rented equipment on the other. 
Since both were necessary to complete the contract in the event 
the court had found the contract to be in force rather than ter-
minated, the contractor was equally justified in retaining both 
its key employees and its necessary rented equipment. 
The case of Blair v. US for the Use of Gregory-Hogan, 147 
F.2d 840, cited by Appellant, recognizes the propriety of awarding 
damages upon a breach of contract for rental payment incurred on 
equipment rented from others. In fact, that case supports Res-
pondent's claims rather than Appellant's. 
In a part not quoted by Appellant, the Blair case, supra, 
also recognizes that there are limits to the duty of the contrac-
tor (upon repudiation of the contract by the other party) to 
minimize his damages, especially where he must stand in readiness 
to perform. (See, Id., 147F.2d at 849.) 
The Restatement of Contracts §335 (1) also recognizes in 
effect, that a party not in breach is not required to incur undue 
risk in order to avoid harm to itself arising out of the breach. 
Comment (a) on that subsection provides as follows: 
"After the Plaintiff has reason to know that a 
breach has occurred . • • he is expected to take such 
steps to avoid harm as a prudent person would take. He 
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cannot get damages for harm that could thus be avoi-
ded ..•• In general, however, it is reasonable for 
the Plaintiff to rely upon the Defendant to perform 
as he has promised ••.• It is not reasonable to 
expect the Plaintiff to avoid harm if at the time 
for action it appears that the attempt may cause 
other serious harm." (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, it appears that at the time of the breach the Plaintiff 
is not required to release its key personnel and all of its ren-
ted equipment, so long as it is reasonable to believe that it is 
possible Plaintiff may later be required to perform the balance 
of the contract. 
In its brief, Appellant " •• concedes that a rental ex-
pense incurred for machinery owned by others may be recoverable 
by Respondent." (Appellant's brief, p. 42.) However, the Ap-
pellant asserts that the rental agreements in this case were 
"purchase contracts in disguise". This is not supported by the 
evidence. Some of the rental agreements contained options to 
purchase the equipment. However, the evidence was uncontroverted 
that the Plaintiff had not exercised the options and didn't in-
tend to. (T.-Darn. 132-133.) 
Appellant also contends that the "cut-off date" for the 
allowance of equipment rentals and salaries to key personnel 
should have been October 22, 1975, the date of Ex.P-9 in which 
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the contractor states "we consider our contract with the state 
has been terminated." (However, the State overlooked this same 
letter in connection with its argument under Point II that the 
contractor had elected to resume work under the contract.) 
The contention of Appellant would have merit if on 
October 22, 1975, Appellant had recognized its own breach of co~ 
tract. However, it did not do so, and the only reason the con-
tractor retained this rented equipment past the date of the 
breach was that until the court ruled otherwise, the State con-
tinued to insist that the contractor was bound to finish the 
work. 
The State should not now be permitted to profit by its own 
intransigence by asserting that the contractor was bound at its 
peril to release its key personnel and essential rental equip-
ment the moment the contractor asserted (which the State disputed) 
that the contract was terminated. 
Based on the same factors, no reason appears why the court 
should have awarded rental expenses incurred for only three 
months instead of the full period of seven months during which 
the issue remained in doubt. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent respectfully submits 
that the Judgment of the trial court should be sustained, except 
that the Judgment should be modified to allow Respondent damages 
for the sum of $446,531.42 as rental expenses incurred on equip-
rnent rented from others, rather than the lesser sum awarded by 
the trial court. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
~. 
ey for Respondent 
Indu trial Construction, Inc. 
social Hall Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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